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The United States academic research market is an important contributor to the 
economy of the United States and the world. Vast wealth has been created from the 
research conducted in universities which, in 2003, amounted to more than $40.0 billion. 
The competition amoung universities for these funds is intense and, in such 
circumstances, the use of strategy and strategic processes is important. Thorough 
strategic processes require a clear understanding of the structure of the market because 
competitive markets require creativity, risk taking, and other market stimulants.  
Based on an application of micro-economic theory, which was chosen because of 
its predictive quality, this paper forwards the current understanding of the structure of the 
academic research market by describing various attributes of the market that might not 
have been previously presented in one place, in this context, or for the purpose of 
informing the strategic formation processes of universities that are engaged in research. 
This paper concludes that the academic research market is not perfectly competitive.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Competition for research funding is intensifying 
among universities in the United States (Feller, 2000). 
While several factors are contributing to this 
intensification, including the insatiability of scientific 
exploration (Rosensweig, 1992), perhaps the most 
important strategic factor underlying this phenomenon 
relates to Lang’s (2004) and Geiger’s (2004) argument that 
institutional reputation is directly related to the value of 
research performed. Since institutional reputation is such 
an important differentiator in higher education, which over 
time is driven by the value of research performed, 
universities are strongly motivated to generate as much 
research as possible (Clark, 1992). The limited size of the 
academic research market forces universities to 
increasingly compete with each other to win research 
funding and declining rates in the proportion of successful 
federal funding proposals is evidence of this trend 
(Newman & Couturier, 2001). 
 
In competitive environments, strategic processes 
are engaged by enterprises to inform their resource 
allocation decision making and there is no shortage of 
literature to be found in popular media or scholarly 
publications that can be used for this purpose. Virtually 
without exception, developing strategy requires an analysis 
of the nature of the market in which competition is 
intended and an environmental scan is required for this 
purpose.  
 
Comments made by writers such as Zemsky 
(2000) suggesting that this market, valued at more than 
$40.0 billion in 2003 (NSF a.), is less advanced than many 
similarly sized markets in other sectors in its use of 
external data to develop strategy raises suspicions as to 
whether universities undertake a sufficient degree of 
external analysis in their strategic development processes. 
Even if the suspected condition is not prevalent, it remains 
the case that all competitors can benefit from enhanced 
knowledge of their markets. 
 
A review of the literature suggests that more can 
be done to enhance the understanding of the academic 
research market. Leslie and Johnson published an 
economic analysis of the higher education market in 1974 
in which they attempted to dissuade governments from 
treating the university market as perfectly competitive. 
However, Leslie and Johnson did not provide a theoretical 
support for his argument and, as well, their focus was 
primarily on the teaching component of university 
operations, only mentioning research in passing. In 1969, 
Galper and Dunn made an econometric attempt to derive 
the short-run demand curve for the student market. 
Analyses of university markets have been presented by 
writers including Dill (2003, 1997), Geiger (2004), Johnes 
(1997), Massy (1990), Zemsky (1997), Tiexeira, 
Jongbloed, Dill, and Amaral (2004), and numerous others, 
however, these typically relate to the contribution that 
universities make to various parts of the economy or to 
society generally, or they are an attempt to analyze public 
policy in order to influence it or to inform universities of 
changes and their potential impact. The literature suggests 
that it is rare for an author to go beyond presenting 
evidence or describing how the nature of the market might 
be causing or has caused participants to behave, 
particularly in relation to academic research.  
 
One exception is Feller’s (2000) chapter in 
Strategy for Competitiveness in Academic Research where 
ten specific strategic positions are presented. Yet, while 
Feller’s strategies are as valid as any, he does not provide 
the theoretical foundation from which these strategies 
might naturally emerge. Another exception is Tornatzky’s 
(2005) chapter in Creating Knowledge, Strengthening 
Nations: The Changing Role of Higher Education which 
forwards Etkowitz, Webster, and Healey’s theories and 
evolutionary tale of university-industry interaction (1998), 
which is an example of work that provides strategic advice 
for the research market that is well grounded. Yet, an 
economic analysis has yet to be presented. 
 
Based on an application of micro-economic 
theory, this paper forwards the current understanding of 
the structure of the academic research market in three 
ways. Firstly, an economic argument can provide 
predictive ability in that, if a market is identified as a 
certain economic type, then the buyers and sellers in that 
market can be expected to behave according to a 
theoretically established pattern. Alternatively, if a market 
is not a certain archetype, certain behaviours can be 
discounted as probable. This information can be invaluable 
to the competitive planning process. In addition, 
envisioning the market through a new lens might stimulate 
creativity, risk taking, or other market stimulants. 
 
Secondly, this paper forwards the understanding of 
the academic research market by developing the 
conclusion that it is not perfectly competitive. This 
conclusion raises a variety of accountability questions 
because it means that there is a potential for universities to 
earn profits by conducting research. For example, as the 
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primary purchaser of research, why should the government 
allow universities to earn profits; or enrich some 
universities but not others? 
 
Finally, this paper describes various attributes of 
the market that might not have been previously presented 
in one place, in this context, or for the purpose of 
informing institutional strategic processes. It demonstrates 
a method of analyzing a market that is large, sophisticated, 
and a major stimulant of economic activity in the United 




While funds used to finance university-based 
research originate from federal and state governments, 
from industry, and from the institutions themselves, in this 
paper the academic research market is defined to include 
only federally financed research. This selection was made 
for the following four reasons, described here in brief: 
 
The first reason relates to the high degree of 
plurality of the federal system of research funding wherein 
any researcher from any institution can submit proposals 
for support (Geiger, 2004). This promotes the widest 
possible range of exploration and intensifies competition, 
attributes that strengthen the system as a whole (Ben-
David, 1972; Birnbaum, 1983) while maintaining the 
public interest. Institutional, state and most industrial 
funded research is not subject to these competitive forces.  
 
The second reason compares the risk that 
universities take when they invest in the capacity that 
supports their research; investments that can take decades 
to yield a full return. Since 1980, the value of federally 
financed research to academia has grown at a consistent 
rate (NSF b.) so that universities can reasonably predict 
what the size of the market will be in the future. Long term 
market assurance mitigates systematic risk. To varying 
degrees, state and institutionally sponsored research also 
meets this criterion. However, funding from industry must 
be considered as volatile if for no other reason than 
businesses that supply the funds are themselves volatile. In 
addition, businesses are not likely to undertake research 
projects whose duration spans more than a couple of years 
(Feller, & Roessner, 1995) and, as such, this funding 
source must be considered as the greater risk. 
 
The third reason measures which stream of 
research revenue constitutes a strategic imperative. One 
way of understanding this question is to speculate as to the 
consequences of cutting off any single stream. While it 
may be an over-simplification to suggest that, at seven 
percent of total research income (NSF a.), industry 
sponsored research is not as important as the 67 percent 
proportion that is financed by the federal government, the 
reality is that, as the Carnegie Foundation defined it in 
2000 (Carnegie Foundation, 2000), there would be no 
research-intensive universities without federal 
involvement.   
 
The fourth reason suggests that the research 
revenue stream that contributes to a university’s national 
and international reputation to the greatest extent is more 
strategically important. In this case, the determining factor 
is whether research is peer adjudication because this is the 
common denominator upon which international 
reputational comparisons are based (Liu, & Cheng, 2005; 
O’Leary, 2004; The Center, 2003). Simply put, most state, 
institutional, and industry sponsored research does not 
meet this condition and federally sponsored research, by 
virtue of the method used to award funding, is peer 
adjudicated.  
 
It should be clarified that these reasons are not 
intended to suggest that research income is not important 
from all sources or that investments in capacity do not 
enable competing for multiple income streams, it is only 
meant to describe a market which can be reasonably 
argued to represent the academic research market for the 
purposes of this analysis. In this paper the academic 
research market is comprised of the federal government 
which, acting in some respects as a monopsonist, is the 
sole buyer of research (the purchaser or principal), and 
hundreds of universities that sell research services to the 
purchaser (the performers or agents).  
 
This is a highly competitive market and, amoung 
the larger performers, the market shares of individual 
universities have changed significantly both while this 
market was in its formative years prior to 19721 as well as 
during a more mature period in the decade ending in 2000 
                                                 
1 Evidence of changing market shares in the early years of the 
research market is reflected in the fact that, in 1972, the NSF 
shows a wide variance in the market shares of universities that 
participated in this market. Since all universities began at very 
low levels of research performance at the end of World War II, it 
can be inferred that institutional market shares changed during 
the period.  
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(NSF c.). As Dill (1997) would define it, this is not a 
“quasi market,” (p. 3). The range in the value of research 
performed by universities is wide with annual expenditures 
of as little as several thousand, with 625 universities 
having expended more than $150,000, and including the 
top performer, Johns Hopkins University, with 
expenditures of more than $1.0 billion in 2002 
(Shackelford, 2004).  
 
In 2002, the top 100 universities accounted for 82 
percent of the market. Geiger and Feller (1995) indicate 
that, in the 1980’s, no single university had a share of the 
research market that was greater than 2.5 percent and 
during that decade, the market share of the 20 largest 
performers declined as the number of academic institutions 
participating in the market for the first time increased. 
With regard to the existence of a colluding group, Taylor 
and Massy (1996) refer to the, “federal peer review 
processes,” (p.19) which resembled an attempt by a group 
of the most research intensive universities to raise barriers 
to entry for smaller institutions. However, given the loss of 
share by the largest recipients, this strategy appears to have 
failed. As a consequence of these factors, it is reasonable 
to suggest that the research market is highly fragmented 
and there is no evidence that it is consolidating. 
 
Segregating the research function of universities 
can be difficult in that it represents only a part of their 
overall operations. In very low level performers, there may 
be no supporting infrastructure, no strategic commitment 
to research, and may represent the effort of a few people or 
even one person in the institution that has won funding for 
a project. The largest performers have substantial 
infrastructure that often includes logistical support, 
management, large investments in fixed capital and 
specialized equipment, even people who lobby the 
purchaser to favour their institution’s bids more often. 
There were 55 universities that performed more than 
$100.0 million and 140 universities that performed more 
than $25.0 million of federally financed research in 2000 
(NSF d.). 
 
In addition to research, the primary function of 
universities is teaching. There is a struggle in the minds of 
many researchers (Slaughter, 2001; Slaughter, & 
Campbell, 1999) and as forcefully described by Massy and 
Zemsky (1994) and many others as to the conflict between 
these functions. What does seem somewhat clear is that the 
actual acts of teaching and research are separate enough 
that, from an operating perspective, the activity of research 
can be thought of as attached to the research infrastructure. 
The distinction being made is only important insofar as by 
using, for example, Activity-Based Costing, revenues and 
costs can be reasonably set off against each other (Lang, 
a., 2004) so that university-based research can be justified 
as an identifiable business. Studies that have demonstrated 
a positive return to economies of scale in the research 
market have resolved this issue sufficiently for the 
purposes of this paper (Cohn, Rhine, & Santos, 1989; 
Patterson, 2000).  In addition, universities that are amoung 
the top 140 performers all conduct research in a number of 
disciplines and sub-disciplines, behaving in many regards 
like multi-unit enterprises for which responsibilities that 
relate to portfolio management exist. Given that university 
research operations most resemble what Mintzberg (1980) 
would call a “professional bureaucracy,” coordinating 
these interests and activities is often a slow and 
cumbersome process. 
 
Within this environment, individual researchers 
and their institutions compete in a market that is well 
developed and sophisticated in that it is highly structured, 
transparent, and informed (Dill, 1997; Geiger, 2004). The 
transparency and structure of the market is reflected in a 
series of readily accessed regulations that governs trade 
and, even though this is a relatively young market, 
business is conducted in an orderly manner where 
traditions are well engrained in most participants.  
 
In the academic research market, competition 
occurs in an exceptionally open and exposed manner. The 
principal is intimately aware of the rules of engagement 
since it is responsible for oversight, and it knows the 
agents, including their histories, their strengths and 
weaknesses, and, by virtue of their proposal submissions, 
their near term intentions. The agents are well informed, or 
are able to be well informed about the principal because 
the principal’s intentions are, to a great extent, a matter of 
public record as are the types and values of awards it is 
funding and has funded. The agents are also well 
informed, or are able to be well informed about their 
competitors through the principal’s records (including NSF 
publications), by monitoring the activities of competitors 
through their strategic statements, faculty lists, faculty 
publication records, technology transfer activities, 
philanthropic and industrial relations initiatives, 
recruitment activities, and capital projects.  
 
There are two basic components of the research 
transaction. The qualitative component of the transaction is 
controlled by a peer review process. The quantitative 
component of the transaction is comprised of overhead 
Economics of Research 5
costs and direct or variable costs. Overhead costs are 
determined by a formula provided by or negotiated with 
the purchaser and are generally a proportion of the variable 
costs (OMB Circular A-21). Variable costs include faculty, 
students, technicians that are involved in the research, 
certain types of equipment, a variety of allowable 
expenses, and consumables. While no markup is allowed 
in the pricing, ranges in the wages of researchers and in the 
number of students that can be included, or choices in 
equipment and methodologies impacts the variable costs of 
a project and since overhead is usually a percentage of the 
variable cost, a certain degree of pricing variability is 
apparent in this market.  
 
In addition, and despite the ideal of equal access, 
institutional reputation is a factor in funding success rates 
(Teich, 2000), as is the reputation of the proposing 
researcher, a reality that is evidenced by the requirement 
by various funding agencies for the researcher’s recent 
funded research history and curriculum vitae to be 
included with each proposal submission (NSF e.). Since 
the wages of the most senior and prestigious researchers 
are generally the highest, an idiosyncracy of the research 
market is that proposals that are the highest relative price 
are more likely to be funded. In other words, signaling 
(Spence, 2001) is an important aspect of this market in that 
the purchaser can buy an increased level of performance 
assurance by paying more for the product. In a certain 
sense, a university can maximize its research income by 
employing the most prestigious researchers (Clark, 1992). 
More importantly for the purposes of this analysis is the 
notion that market participants understand that the research 
product is differentiated by quality and that quality is 
measured by, amoung other things, the research history of 
the researcher and the sponsoring institution. 
 
Amoung existing universities, barriers to exit are 
high not so much because it is difficult to physically 
terminate employees (even tenured faculty) and retool 
buildings, but because, like every enterprise, downsizing is 
a last resort: nobody wants to admit defeat. In addition, 
decisions are often made slowly; most programs also serve 
the public good; financial considerations go beyond 
research and; even once decisions are made, programmatic 
momentum can keep departments alive while students 
complete curriculum. The reality is that university capacity 
is sticky (Massy, 1996); once it is in place, it is likely that 
it will remain in place for the long term.  
 
Overcapacity in the research market is reflected in 
the emphasis that universities have put on attracting 
research from all sources which is evidenced by the 
placing of a high value on faculty that help satisfy this 
need (Slaughter, 2001). If a university was nearing its 
maximum ability to deliver research services, it would 
more likely take on a “seller’s market” demeanor which 
could include demanding more stringent terms from 
potential research sponsors. Aggressively promoting the 
generation of research, both internally and externally, is 
more reflective of the reality. In addition, the deepening of 
the research relationship with industry can be viewed as 
revenue diversification, a technique often employed to 
more fully utilize existing capacity. Lastly, overcapacity is 
a chronic symptom of markets with high exit barriers 
(Porter, 1979) 
 
In any given year the demand curve in the research 
market is downward sloping. The main factors leading to 
this assumption are firstly, that the federal government 
determines the dollar value of the market each year; it does 
not predetermine the number of research projects that it is 
prepared to fund (NSF f.). Secondly, the demand for 
research funds has, in recent decades, always exceeded the 
supply and, as such, it is presumed that virtually all of the 
available funds were absorbed into the market. Given these 
conditions, if the average value of research projects rises, 
then the number of research projects purchased would be 
lower. Likewise, if the average value of research projects 
falls, then the quantity of research projects purchased 
would be higher. This inverse relationship translates to a 
downward sloping demand curve in the academic research 
market; a curve with a slope with a value of less than zero. 
Since the slope of the demand curve is negative, the slope 
of the marginal revenue curve is also negative and the 
degree of steepness of the marginal revenue curve is twice 
the steepness of the demand curve. Notably, in recent 
decades, the demand curve has shifted to the right each 
year as total available funding for research, in real terms, 
has increased. 
 
In the academic research market, a downward 
sloping marginal revenue curve also translates into 
individual universities, a condition supported by Massy 
(1990). Downward sloping marginal revenue indicates that 
universities face a negatively sloping demand curve, 




The primary source used to inform the economic 
components of this analysis was Douglas (1992). It should 
be noted that this is a qualitative analysis and not intended 
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to be an econometric study. In this regard, the arguments 
support the most likely condition rather than providing 
exact values. Descriptions of these trends are presented by 
statements that indicate whether the slope of a line or 
curve is upward or downward sloping or whether it is 
positively or negatively sloped. Any reference as to the 
degree of steepness of the slope of a line or relative 
steepness of a line is explicitly stated. 
 
Perfect competition describes a market situation 
whereby the product being sold is completely 
undifferentiated and, as such, every firm’s product is a 
perfect substitute for that of every other firm. In addition, 
the number of competitors is sufficiently large to prevent 
any single competitor from having any influence on 
market conditions such as price. As theory holds, each 
firm can sell all it produces at the market equilibrium price 
and decides how much it will produce based on its own 
costs. In this regard, each firm has to accept the price as a 
given.  
 
As a price taker, where price is constant regardless 
of output, the firm’s marginal revenue is equal to price, 
which is represented by a horizontal line with a slope equal 
to zero. If any firm raises its selling price, even by a small 
amount, it will lose all of its business because price 
elasticity of demand is infinite. Alternatively, any firm that 
lowers its price would be expected to gain a vast share of 
the market. Given the importance of signaling in 
generating research funding, these phenomena are not 
apparent in the research market. In other words, a 
university that lowers its prices would not likely increase 
its research revenue substantially and therefore, price 
elasticity of demand is not infinite. The more probable 
reality is that price elasticity of demand is highly elastic 
and, in some instances, might be positively related to price 
in that, considering the signaling that occurs, higher prices 
could generate increased unit demand and ultimately a 
higher volume of research performed at a university.  
 
As an example, moderate pricing fluctuations did 
not have a significant effect on the value of research 
performed during the era prior to the imposition of fixed 
overhead rates where some universities that were charging 
high amounts of overhead continued to gain market share 
(NSF c.). This would suggest that, under a less regulated 
regime, neither the variable or overhead component of the 
research transaction is perfectly competitive. In 1994, 
when the federal government finally imposed overhead 
rates on the market, it was not because some universities 
were gaining or losing market share, rather it was done to 
prevent some universities from earning excess profits 
(Energy and Commerce Committee, 103rd Congress). 
These events imply that the research market is not 
naturally perfectly competitive and that the imposition of 
fixed overhead rates left the variable cost part of the 
transaction more free to operate in open market conditions. 
 
In perfect competition, reactions to changes in 
market conditions occur in the short term in that increases 
in demand are filled by entering firms and reductions in 
demand results in firms exiting the market. In other words, 
there are very low barriers to entry and, more pertinent to 
this analysis, there are very low barriers to exit the market. 
Thus, another factor as to why the research market is likely 
not perfectly competitive is the reality that, as previously 
described, research capacity is sticky. The consequence of 
high barriers to exit is a tendency for overcapacity to 
develop in the short run. Overcapacity results in a 
declining marginal revenue curve, not a condition that 
would be expected in a perfectly competitive market. 
 
Importantly for the purchaser of research, perfect 
competition ensures the most efficient allocation of 
resources which is most often interpreted to mean the 
lowest prices for the product; the lowest average price paid 
in the short and long term. This is because, in all time 
horizons, the firm’s marginal cost curve equals marginal 
revenue and price at the lowest point on the firm’s “U-
shaped” average cost curve. If any firm produced more or 
less quantity, its average cost per unit of production would 
be higher. Since all firms are producing at this point, the 
purchaser is paying the lowest average price and because 
average cost is equal to price there is no economic profit.  
 
In higher education, the question of what 
constitutes the lowest average cost is not easily defined. In 
regard to teaching, it is difficult to imagine being able to 
maintain the exactly correct number of students in every 
section and the exactly correct number credit hours 
delivered by each professor so that any reduction would 
result in a higher cost and any increase would result in a 
reduction of quality (which is a future cost). The issue of 
quality is a fundamental uncertainty. Notably, the 
objective of performance indicators usually encourages 
institutions to operate at the lowest possible cost, not the 
lowest average cost.  
 
Identifying the lowest average cost for research 
may be even more difficult. The problem is that there may 
be no maximum value of research that can be performed 
by a researcher. That is, over the span of a 20 or 30 year 
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career, any given researcher could be continually winning 
larger and larger awards with greater frequency. In the 
history of performance indicators that measure, in one 
form or another, the value of sponsored research 
performed per researcher, no maximum or ideal has yet to 
be established. If this continues to be the case, than the 
lowest average cost of research operations may never be 
achieved and this situation would generate an average cost 
curve that is perpetually downward sloping. An inverse 
relationship in some form of y = x-1, where y is a 
university’s average cost of operating its research business 
and x is the value of research performed, can be expected.  
 
Applying this notion in the example of a perfectly 
competitive market, where price and marginal revenue are 
represented by a horizontal line with slope equal to zero, in 
all cases where the short and long run average cost is 
greater than price, firms will exit the market and in all 
cases where short and long run average cost is less than 
price, firms will enter the market. An equilibrium exists 
where the average cost equals price. However, since the 
average cost curve is perpetually declining, equilibrium 
can only be approached after the ratio of the cost of 
supporting a university’s research operation to its value of 
research performed causes its average cost curve to 
“flatten out.” In this regard, the market price can be 
thought of as the asymptote of the average cost curve 
where the average cost approaches price from above.  
 
The first derivative of the aforementioned 
relationship is y = -x-2, yielding a perpetually increasing 
marginal cost curve that approaches its asymptote at price 
from below. This is important because, in the example of 
perfect competition, the marginal revenue and marginal 
cost curves for the academic research market will never 
intersect and, as such, there would be no ideal amount of 
research for an institution to perform. A normal 
interpretation of the theory of perfect competition would 
suggest that if there is no minimum average cost there 
cannot be a perfect competition equilibrium point because 
firms will never be satisfied with their level of output; they 
will always want to produce more. In addition, the 
purchaser can always reduce its average cost by increasing 
its volume of purchases. That is, the more that the 
purchaser buys, the lower will be its average cost. This 
situation is unsustainable in the research market because, 
even though performers will want to continually produce 
more, the value of the market is not unlimited and, as a 
consequence, while the purchaser may or may not be 
paying the lowest average cost for the quantity it is 
purchasing, it is definitely not paying the lowest possible 
average cost. This instability leads to oversupply and a 
declining marginal revenue curve for the performers, a 
situation that more closely resembles actual academic 
market conditions than it does perfect competition. 
 
In addition, since it has already been established 
that the marginal revenue curve in the research market is 
declining, there will be an intercept with the marginal cost 
curve at a point that will be a university’s ideal point of 
output. Importantly, not only is this point not at the 
university’s lowest average cost, but it is also at a level of 
output that is less than the output that would equate to a 
university’s lowest average cost. 
 
Another issue to be addressed is that different 
relative prices for research could be interpreted as first 
price discrimination whereby each firm’s exact cost is paid 
for each transaction even though the cost of each 
transaction is different. This situation would manifest as 
variable pricing paid for research reflecting the differing 
content of each funded proposal. Indeed, this scenario may 
fit the monopsony-perfect competition model very well in 
that the monopsonist, having perfect knowledge of the 
performers’ costs, would alter market conditions to ensure 
that it earned all available profits, thereby removing 
welfare loss from the market. 
 
The main justification for discounting the 
probability that monopsony-perfect competition is the 
primary operational model in the research market is that 
universities can earn profits by conducting research. A 
closer examination of the mechanism underlying the claim 
that short term profits can be realized in the research 
market may add credence to this position.  
 
Comparing the research productivity of the faculty 
at the University of Arizona and Ohio State University 
exemplifies one source of profit that universities can earn 
from conducting research. In 2005, the average value of 
research performed by full time equivalent (FTE) faculty 
at Ohio State (Ohio State University) was $184,784 and 
was $242,301 at the University of Arizona (University of 
Arizona). Assuming that each institution had an indirect 
cost recovery rate of 45 percent, the University of Arizona 
collected $17,850 more per faculty than did Ohio State. 
Since the University of Arizona has 1612.98 FTE faculty, 
it generated almost $29.0 million more in gross profit than 
it would have had it realized Ohio State’s gross profit 
ratio. Compounding this difference is the fact that Ohio 
State paid its professors, associate professors, and assistant 
professors $108,000, $72,000, and $60,000 respectively 
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for nine months of the 2004-05 year while the equivalent 
rates at the University of Arizona were $95,000, 67,000, 
and $60,000 (National Center for Educational Statistics, 
2004-05). This means that the gross profit earned from 
research expressed as a ratio of dollars of wages paid was 
even greater than the ratio expressed in terms of the 
number of faculty. From the perspective of researcher 
productivity, it is likely that the University of Arizona’s 
research business is more profitable than Ohio State’s. 
Given that Ohio State had 2,991.6 FTE faculty, it lost 
potential earnings of several tens of millions of dollars. 
Mechanically, the University of Arizona earns a portion of 
the extra gross profit every time a research project is 
undertaken and, as such, these profits are short term. 
 
The second scenario that demonstrates the short 
term profitability of the university research business is one 
in which the productivity of researchers across institutions 
is equated but where the relative cost of supporting 
research differs. Many universities, particular larger 
research performers, track process indicators such as the 
“Number of Protocols Processed Per Full-Time Employee 
(FTE), 2004,” (Pennsylvania State University) however, 
the measure that would more accurately describe the 
profitability of the research business is to measure the 
actual indirect cost of research in a given period and divide 
this amount by the number of funded research projects that 
occurred during this period. This calculation produces the 
average indirect cost of research per funded project. Where 
the productivity of researchers is similar, that is, in the 
instance where the gross profit earned per research project 
across institutions is similar, those universities that have a 
lower value of indirect cost per project are enjoying higher 
profits. In addition, these are short term earnings because 
the more profitable universities will earn those profits 
every time a research project is funded.  
 
The two examples given, those being the 
variability in researcher productivity and the variability in 
relative indirect costs, demonstrates that universities can 
earn short term profits in the research market. As more 
prestigious researchers are often the most productive and 
as institutional reputation can positively affect funding 
awards, the argument that a moderate level of long term 
profits are available in the research market is also 
supported. These factors further suggest that the research 
market is not perfectly competitive and that the 
monopsony influence is weak. 
 
The final part of the argument refers to the 
importance of signaling in winning research awards. 
Signaling is reflected in the reputations of the researcher 
and sponsoring institution, as well as in the wide variances 
in research capacity that exists within disciplines across 
universities (Atkinson, and Massy, 1996) or even across 
disciplines within a single university. These factors of 
production provide universities with the capability of 
assembling a unique set of outputs for each transaction in 
which it is bidding. In the research market, this constitutes 
product differentiation because it enables an institution to 
offer the buyer potentially more reliable results by 
adjusting inputs. Gaining a market advantage by using a 
differentiation strategy (Porter, 1985) is contrary to the 





Short and long term overcapacity manifested by a 
declining marginal revenue curve, the ability to earn short 
term profits, an environment in which sellers demonstrate 
variable gross profits and operating cost structures, and the 
use of a differentiation strategy to gain market advantage 
provides a strong underpinning for the position that the 
academic research market is not perfectly competitive. 
Notably, it is important to recognize that this market is not 
a pure manifestation of any economic archetype and these 
impurities may have strategic consequences.  
 
If the market behaves more like an oligopoly or 
monopolistic competition than it does like perfect 
competition, then universities can earn profits from 
research. While many accountability issues arise from this 
conclusion, institutional strategic processes could be more 
completely informed by determining which economic 
archetype most closely describes this very important 
market. The type of analysis used in this paper can be 
extended for this purpose. 
 
If profits are available to universities in the 
research enterprise, then it is likely that more universities 
will want to do it. This will tend to intensify an already 
highly competitive market and, as the level of competition 
rises, so will the lengths that universities go to win 
funding. Increased vigilance will be required. 
 
Perhaps the most important issue raised by this 
paper is the notion that the academic research market has 
reached a level of importance to individual universities, to 
the higher education system, and to the economy generally 
that demands greater study and understanding. Much as 
Keller (1983) made a call to arms to higher education in 
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